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UK JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING  
Filip Gelev* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, without being suspected of committing or planning to commit 
any crime in Australia, a federal court issued a “control order” against Mr 
Jack Thomas “to protect the public and substantially assist in preventing a 
terrorist act”. The court was of the view that unless the order was made 
“Mr Thomas's knowledge and skills could provide a potential resource for 
the planning or preparation of a terrorist act.”1 Mr Thomas admitted that 
before 9/11 he trained with in an Al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan and 
continued his connection with Taliban sympathisers up until January 2003 
when he was arrested in Pakistan.2 In October 2008 Mr Thomas was 
acquitted by a jury in another court of the charge of accepting funds from 
a terrorist organisation.3 He is still subject to a control order.4 
* This paper is an abridged and updated version of the author’s master’s thesis completed
at the Vrije Universiteit (Free University), Amsterdam in June 2008. The author wishes to 
thank his thesis supervisor Prof. dr. Wouter Werner for his boundless patience, 
enthusiasm, wisdom and guidance.  
1 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194, 201; [2007] HCA 33, [1]. Most court cases 
below are referenced using the case neutral citation with paragraph numbers in square 
brackets and, where the case is reported, we also use the relevant law reports page 
numbers (eg Re Charkaoui, 2003 FC 882 (CanLII), [39]; [2004] 1 F.C.R. 528, 545). For 
some older cases (referred to only a few times) we utilise the official law report reference 
without the case neutral citation (eg Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth 
(1951) 83 CLR 1). 
2 R v Thomas (No 3) 14 VR 512. 
3 He was convicted of falsifying a passport. See Milanda Rout, “Jack Thomas Acquitted 
on Al-Qa’ida Charge but Guilty of Falsifying Passport”, The Australian, 23 October 
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From 2003 until 2005, without being suspected of committing or planning 
to commit any crimes in Canada in the immediate future, Mr Adil 
Charkaoui was detained as a danger to the security of Canada because, 
among other things, he was a karate enthusiast. The court agreed with the 
executive government: “In the past, it has been observed that some 
individuals involved with Al-Qaeda are devoted to the practice of karate 
and/or the martial arts” most notably one of 9/11 hijackers.5 
In 2006, the judiciary in the UK confirmed a control order against MB, the 
basis of which was not the suspicion that he may have committed a crime, 
but to prevent him from travelling from the UK to Iraq where he allegedly 
wanted to fight against Coalition Forces.6 
Theses three cases epitomise “preventative” or “preventive” justice. The 
law is employed as an instrument for prevention, not as punishment for 
past acts (eg an attempted bombing) or adjudication of a legal dispute 
about an individual’s rights (eg the right to remain in a country). More 
interestingly, they are examples of the judiciary engaging in legal 
reasoning through which it fills the gaps in the executive’s deployment of 
preventative justice. 
There is now a body of scholarly work in International Relations based on 
Ulrich Becks’ risk society and the associated ideas of precaution and 
prevention, and Michel Foucault’s ideas on governmentality, critiquing the 
expansion of executive power in general and in national security matters 
related to the ‘war on terrorism’ in particular. 
2008. Accessed on 1 November 2008 at 
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24540864-601,00.html. 
4 Personal conversation between the author and the legal firm representing Mr Thomas on 
18 November 2008. 
5 Re Charkaoui, 2003 FC 882 (CanLII), [50]; [2004] 1 F.C.R. 528, 548-9. 
6 MB v Home Secretary [2006] EWHC 1000, [20].  




Governments across the world pass new laws or seek to utilise existing 
powers in new ways to proscribe organisations, detain people without trial, 
increase border controls, accumulate vast amount of data, freeze assets and 
so on.7 Werner and Johns see the logic of precaution in different measures 
and policies, e.g., the anticipatory use of force, the blacklisting of 
individuals, targeted killings, profiling and surveillance, and preventative 
detention.8  
 
In this context, some International Relations scholars have argued that the 
judiciary’s proper role is to act as a counter-balance to executive, and to a 
lesser extent parliamentary overreach,9 or as a guardian of human rights.10 
Little attention has been paid to judicial reasoning allowing or even 
reinforcing these governmentality practices. The main question we pose in 
this article is whether, and if so how, the discourse of risk and the 
precautionary approach affect the argumentative structure and substance 
of judicial decision making. Our hypothesis is that it is simplistic to see 
the judiciary as a watchdog keeping the other branches of government in 
check and that the courts’ role is much more limited both in practice and 
as perceived by members of the judiciary.  
 
                                                 
7 C. Walker, “Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of 
Constitutionalism”, (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1395, 1400. 
8 W. Werner and F. Johns, (2008) 21(4) “The Risks of International Law”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law 783, 784-5 
9 Sometimes no specific distinction is drawn between actions of the executive and the 
legislature. See eg J. McCuloch, “Contemporary Comments. Australia’s Anti-Terrorism 
Legislation and the Jack Thomas Case”, (2006) 18(2) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 
357. 
10 D. Hovell, “Black Holes or Loopholes? Human Rights in the Risk Society”, HREOC 
Seminar, Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law, UNSW (6 April 2005). Last accessed 
on 7 April 2008 at 
www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/Publications/docs/pubs/2005_BlackHolesorLoopholes.doc. 
See also D. Dyzenhaus, “Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and 
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The paper consists of two sections. In the first section we discuss the ideas 
of Ulrich Beck and Michel Foucault as they relate to preventative justice 
and then we turn to the role of the judiciary in times of emergency, 
including the post 9/11 war on terror. In the second section we turn to the 
case-law to focus on how the discourse of risk, precaution and prevention 
permeate legal reasoning. 
 
The case-law comprises six sets of cases,11 i.e., two sets from three 
countries each – Australia, Canada and the UK, at the highest level 
available.12 We selected the cases, first, because they are all from the 
common law legal family. The legal systems of the three countries are 
close enough to provide meaningful parallels and different enough to 
argue that any common trends are due to broad philosophical and doctrinal 
trends. Secondly, we looked for common themes such as preventative 
laws. The cases are organised thematically under the following headings: 
Preventative justice (2.1), Human rights and precaution (2.2) and 
Sovereignty v global threats and solutions (2.3).13 
 
This publication is not meant as a standard legal analysis of the cases, that 
is, for example, an analysis of who was successful in the legal proceedings 
(or who in our view should have been successful) or whether parts of the 
relevant laws were declared invalid (or whether in our view they should 
have been declared invalid).14 One cannot draw definite conclusions from 
                                                 
11 Some of the ‘sets’ include decisions at several different levels of the judicial system 
and civil as well as criminal proceedings. Some of the UK and Canadian cases involved 
more than one individual in each case. 
12 Out of the 6 sets of proceedings, Haneef is the only one not decided by the highest 
court of appeal of the relevant country. 
13 This article is an abridged version of my masters thesis. In the thesis there were no 
themes. Instead, I went through an analysis of the six cases, one after the other. 
14 For an analysis of Thomas see E. MacDonald, E. and G. Williams, “Combatting 
Terrorism: Australia’s Criminal Code Since September 11”, (2007) 16 Griffith Law 
Review 27. Last accessed on 28 May 2008 at 
http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/publications/docs/pubs/Terrorism_Criminal_Law2.pdf. 
For an analysis of Charkaoui see T. Poole, “Recent Developments in the War on 
Terrorism in Canada” (2008) 7(3) Human Rights Law Review 633. For an analysis of JJ, 
MB, and E, see C. Forsyth “Control Orders, Conditions Precedent and Compliance with 




a small sample of six cases. Nevertheless, in the conclusion we argue that 
one can discern a pattern in the way courts approach the fight against 
terrorism.  
 
A. ULRICH BECK AND RISK SOCIETY 
 
Since Ulrich Beck’s book Risk Society appeared in English in 1992 
discussions of risk have become ubiquitous in many different disciplines.15 
According to Beck today we live in “risk society” characterised by 
uncontrollable risks, which are not merely unnatural and human-made but 
beyond boundaries.16 Unlike governments in industrial society which 
sought to ensure the distribution of goods, in risk society the aim is to 
achieve the prevention of “bads” – pollution, global pandemics or nuclear 
disasters17 – but these common bads can no longer be contained spatially 
or temporally.18 The attacks of 11 September 2001 led Beck to add 
                                                                                                                         
Art 6(1)”, (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal” 1 and D. Feldman, “Deprivation of 
Liberty in Anti-Terrorism Law”, (2008) 67 Cambridge Law Journal” 4. For a brief 
overview of the “character test” (the Haneef case) see S. Harris Rimmer, “Character as 
Destiny: The dangers of character tests in Commonwealth law”, A talk given at the 
Weekend of Ideas, Manning Clark House, The Australia Institute (29 March 2008). Last 
accessed on 29 May 2008 at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=susan_harris_rimm
er. For Suresh see D.W. Elliot “Suresh and the Common Borders of Administrative Law: 
Time for the Tailor?” (2002) 65 Saskatchewan Law Review 469 and M. Coutu and M-H. 
Giroux, “The Aftermath of September 11: Liberty v Security before the Supreme Court 
of Canada”, (2006) 18(2) International Journal of Refugee Law 313. Finally, for Rehman 
see D. Bonner and R. Cholewinski, “The Response of the United Kingdom’s Legal and 
Constitutional Orders to the 1991 Gulf War and the Post-9/11 ‘War’ on Terrorism” in E. 
Guild and A. Baldaccini (eds.) Terrorism and the Foreigner. A decade of tension around 
the rule of law in Europe, (2007) Leiden: Nijhoff, 2007, 123-175. 
15 G. Mythen, “Reappraising the Risk Society Thesis: Telescopic Sight or Myopic 
Vision?”, (2007) 55(3) Current Sociology 793-813, 793-4. 
16 U. Beck, “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited” (2002) 19(4) Theory, 
Culture & Society 39-55, 41. 
17 U. Beck, 1992, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage, 49. 
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terrorism to the list of different “dimensions” or “dynamics” of world risk 
society.19  
 
A key idea associated with risk theory is that decision makers should take 
precautionary measures to prevent or minimise harm in circumstances 
where there is uncertainty about the exact nature and extent of the risk.20  
 
Risk society is global and universal21 and nobody is safe against 
phenomena such as pandemics, terrorist acts or global warming. When a 
risk, such as a nuclear explosion, eventuates it has catastrophic or 
irremediable effects.22 New technologies and the advances in science do 
not minimise but rather multiply risks; “genetic engineering, 
nanotechnology and robotics” open new Pandora’s boxes.23 Because of the 
potentially disastrous scale of, for example, a terrorist attack, governments 
consider any chance that such an event may occur, no matter how small 
the probability, to be unacceptable, that is, “any degree of likelihood [is] 
too great to tolerate”. Ron Suskind has called this the One Per Cent 
                                                                                                                         
18 G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security”, (2008) 39(2-
3) Security Dialogue 221, 223. It is hard to pinpoint the exact time when ‘risk society’ 
supposedly came into existence, but I am more concerned with the post 9/11 period when 
terrorism ‘joined’ the myriad of other risks. 
19 U. Beck, “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited”, (2002) 19(4) Theory, 
Culture & Society 39, 39-40 
20 P. O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government, Glasshouse Press: New York, 2004, 
3. 
21 G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Criminology and Terrorism. Which Thesis? Risk Society 
or Governmentality?” (2006) 46 British Journal of Criminology 379, 384. 
22 G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security”, (2008) 39(2-
3) Security Dialogue 221, 224. 
23 U. Beck “The Silence of Words and Political Dynamics in the World Risk Society” 
(2002) 1 Logos 1, 9. 




Doctrine. Governments are guided by no more than “actionable suspicion” 
in the quest to prevent unknown disasters.24 
 
Thus, at the heart of risk society there is an unresolvable paradox because 
“while risk has been enormously productive of institutions, technologies 
of the self and new commodities, precaution is said to offer nothing.”25 
Furthermore, some precautionary measures may be effective some of the 
time but, as Rasmussen puts it, “risks are infinite because they multiply 
over time since one can always do more to prevent them from becoming 
real.” 26 As a result executive governments are forced to “feign control 
over the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, technology, economy 
and everyday life.”27  
 
The application of the principles of precaution in relation to terrorism 
assumes that terrorists act in a random and irrational manner,28 similar to a 
virus, or a genetic mutation, which makes it impossible for governments to 
know what anticipatory measures to take. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist 
acts, some have argued that “anything, anywhere is at risk.”29  
 
                                                 
24 R. Suskind, The One Per Cent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of Its Enemies 
Since 9/11, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006, 166 as cited in M. de Goede, “The 
Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, (2008) 14(1) European Journal 
of International Relations 161, 164. 
25 P. O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government, Glasshouse Press: New York, 2004, 
178. 
26 M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the 
Twenty-First Century, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, 4. 
27 U. Beck “The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisted” (2002) 19(4) Theory, 
Culture & Society 39–55, 43. 
28 G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security”, (2008) 39(2-
3) Security Dialogue 221, 225-6. 
29 M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the 
Twenty-First Century, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004, 4. 
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Governments are caught in a vicious cycle of their own creation: they 
must invent newer and ever more frantic measures whose effectiveness is 
both impossible to measure and perceived as inherently transient.30 To 
borrow the former US Defence Secretary’s phraseology, the risk of 
terrorism is managed as “an unknown unknown”, a thing we do not know 
we do not know.31  
 
Philip Bobbitt describes the way the West, and the US in particular, will 
be fighting ‘terror’ in the 21st century and introduces the term 
“preclusion”:32 
 
Taking decisions to preclude a state of terror – whether by 
arresting a would-be terrorist who has yet to commit a crime, [or] 
by pre-empting a state that has yet to complete its acquisition of 
WMD … depends upon estimates of the future. Rarely before have 
governments had to rely so heavily on speculation about the future 
because a failure to act in time could have such irrevocable 
consequences. 
 
In the second section of this article we seek to demonstrate that courts 
sometimes adopt this view as well. This exercise in precaution turns on its 
head the principle that judicial power is about deciding “existing rights 
and duties... according to law. That is to say, it does so by the application 
                                                 
30 M. Welch, “Sovereign impunity in America’s war on terror: examining reconfigured 
power and the absence of accountability”, (2007) 47 Crime, Law and Social Change 135-
150, 137 
31BBC News, “Rum remark wins Rumsfled an award”, 2 December 2003.  
Last accessed on 30 May 2008 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3254852.stm. The 
full comment was “Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always 
interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we 
know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there 
are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we 
don't know we don't know”. Last accessed on 30 May 2008 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3254852.stm. 
32 Philip Bobbitt,  Terror and Consent, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2008, 291. 




of a pre-existing standard rather than by the formulation of policy or the 
exercise of an administrative discretion.“33 Critics of laws based on 
precaution have claimed that “[w]e are witnessing the end of criminal 
law”34 and courts are part and parcel of this phenomenon. 
 
Risk society theory, and the precautionary principle, provides a useful 
analytical tool in relation to judicial decision making post 9/11. In some 
cases courts adopt the language of risk society even though it is more 
likely than not that the judges are not aware of the ideas of Ulrich Beck. A 
good example is Thomas, a case analysed further in Section 2. In oral 
argument counsel for the executive government, compared terrorism to the 
threat of “invaders from outer space”, “a rogue asteroid” hitting Australia 
or “migratory birds infected with avian flu.”35  
 
The High Court of Australia adopted this discourse of risk society, on 
occasions verbatim from the executive government’s (as the respondent in 
the litigation) oral submissions, eg eight reasons36 which present an 
apocalyptic picture of what made Australia “particularly vulnerable” to a 
                                                 
33 Brandy v Human Rights Commission [1995] HCA 10; (1995) 183 CLR 245, 268 as 
cited in Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33, Kirby J [306]. 
34 Richard Ericson, Crime in an Insecure World, 2006 as cited in Andrew Goldsmith, 
“Preparation for Terrorism: Catastrophic Risk and Precautionary Criminal Law” A. 
Lynch, E. MacDonald and G. Williams (eds.), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror, 
Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007, 59-74, at 60. 
35 Transcript of hearing in the case of Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCATrans 76 (20 
February 2007). Last accessed on 28 April 2008 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2007/76.html. 
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terrorist attack.37 Australia faced an unprecedented and “frightening 
combination of circumstances”:38  
 
The scale and almost inestimable capacity of accessible, modern, 
destructive technology to cause harm, render attempts to draw 
analogies with historical atrocities … unconvincing.  
 
Counsel for Mr Thomas unsuccessfully argued that the government was 
merely making assertions about Australia’s increased vulnerability today 
compared to earlier periods in history. One of the High Court justices 
responded thus:39 
 
But it is going to escalate. As science discovers more ways of 
killing people you are going to get more and more – the threat is 
going to increase and it is no good saying, “Well, it was not a 
problem in the past”. I mean, each problem is an escalating 
problem. 
 
To put the same idea in Foucauldian terms (see below at 1.2), some courts 
“govern themselves within the regimes of truth that surround the ‘national 
security’ in times of exceptional politics”.40 On a practical level judges do 
not want to place national security at risk or be seen to be soft on 
(potential) terrorists.  
                                                 
37 In additions, the Solicitor-General of Australia gave “the easy example perhaps of the 
terrorist who has access to an atomic weapon and there is a risk that if allowed free he 
will place it somewhere and explode it”. Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCATrans 76 (20 
February 2007). Last accessed on 28 April 2008 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2007/76.html. 
38 Thomas v Mowbray per Callinan J [2007] HCA 33, [544]; (2007) 237 ALR 194, 342. 
Also Heydon J, [2007] HCA 33, [648]-[649]; (2007) 237 ALR 194, 371, rejected the 
argument that the government was making assertions as to possible future occurrences. 
39 Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCATrans 78 (21 February 2006). Last accessed on 28 
April 2008 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2007/78.html. 
40 V. Jabri, “The Limits of Agency in Times of Emergency” in J. Huysmans, A. Dobson 
and R. Prokhovnik (eds.) The Politics of Protection. Sites of Insecurity and Political 
Agency, New York: Routledge, 2006, 145. 





B. FOUCAULT AND GOVERNMENTALITY 
 
Foucauldian theory yields a somewhat different theoretical analysis of 
various preventive justice measures than risk society theory. A 
Foucauldian approach focuses on the employing tactics to achieve certain 
ends rather than the objective reality, the laws or formal structures of 
government.41  
 
Foucauldian theory views power as fragmented, dispersed or decentred42 
and within this analytical framework courts do not stand in opposition to 
executive governments. The object and activity of government, including 
the judiciary, are not given or static; they have to be invented and 
learned.43 A “rationality of government” (or “governmentality”) then is 
about a “system of thinking about the nature of the practice of 
government, capable of making some form of that activity thinkable and 
practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon whom it was 
practised.”44 The other aspect of government, the “technology of 
government”, encompasses the practical means through which a rationality 
is realised.45 
 
                                                 
41 M. Foucault, “Governmentality” in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The 
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, 
87-104, 95. 
42 Y.-K. Heng and K. McDonagh, “The other War on Terror revealed: global 
governmentality and the Financial Action Task Force’s campaign against terrorist 
Financing” (2008) 34 Review of International Studies 553-573, 561. 
43 G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, x. 
44 Ibid., 3. 
45 C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking 
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International 
Relations 89, 97. 
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In this context, a “dispositif” of government consists of the combination of 
rationalities and technologies which influence behaviour and 
simultaneously “construct forms of ordered agency and subjectivity in the 
population to be governed as part of the social problem identified”,46 
whether it is global warming, taking action ostensibly to stop a state from 
developing weapons of mass destruction, fighting crime (drugs in 
particular) or the war on terror. Governmentality is based on perceptions, 
not necessarily on realities. Ulrich Beck himself, even though he is 
preoccupied with what he sees as a real (not imaginary) risk of terrorism, 
wrote soon after 9/11 that:47  
 
What is politically crucial is ultimately not the risk itself but the 
perception of the risk. What men fear to be real is real in its 
consequences – fear creates its own reality. […] The perceived risk 
of terrorism, politically instrumentalised, unleashes security needs, 
which wipe out freedom and democracy, the very things which 
constitute the superiority of modernity.  
 
Aradau and van Munster identify risk and precaution as being in the centre 
of the rationality of government vis-à-vis terrorism. They argue that 
“precautionary risk has emerged in the dispositif of risk to govern 
terrorism,48 where other technologies have proven fallible or 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 97. 
47 U. Beck, “The Cosmopolitan State”, Eurozine, 5 December 2001.  
Last accessed on 20 December 2008 at http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2001-12-05-
beck-en.html. 
48 Dispositif consists of “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, 
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions.” M. Foucault, “The Confessions of the Flesh” in C. Gordon 
(ed.) Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977, 194–228, 
New York: Pantheon Books, 1980, 194 as cited in C. Aradau and R. van Munster, 
“Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, 
(2007) 13(1) European Journal of International Relations 89, 97. 




insufficient.”49 They claim that there is a move to “drastic prevention” in 
policies ranging from the hunt for Osama bin Laden ‘dead or alive’, the 
UK police shoot-to-kill policy, pre-emptive strikes against terrorist targets, 
indefinite detention and extraordinary ‘rendition’ to third states or 
indefinite detention.50  
 
What is interesting is that most scholars have not only focused their 
criticism almost exclusively on the executive but have further declared 
their faith in the judiciary’s ability (or at least in the judiciary’s role to 
endeavour) to act as a counterbalance to the executive.51  
 
Critics of anti-terrorism measures taken after 9/11 claim that terrorism is a 
pretext for cynical executive governments to create “law free zones“ in 
which “political will reigns and the rule of law has no purchase“.52  
 
Jef Huysmans says that an essential characteristic of liberal democracies is 
that political power is subjugated by the rule of law, i.e., subject to judicial 
control.53 Political power exercised by the executive, when left unchecked, 
can lead to “the institutionalization of decisionist government”, that is:  
                                                 
49 C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking 
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International 
Relations 89, 102. 
50 Ibid., 103-104. 
51 There are exceptions. Richard V. Ericson in his book Crime in an Insecure World 
2006, Polity Press, speaks to the role of courts, among others, in the criminalization 
across domains as diverse as national security, social security, corporate security and 
domestic security. 
52 This view is not universally held. Many scholars, particularly in the US argue that the 
precautionary approach is appropriate. For example, Tom Campbell criticises those who 
argue that courts should control executive power: “How can this be done without in effect 
replacing one lot of guardians with another and making the judges into those officials 
whose discretion is determinative”. T. Campbell, “Blaming Legal Positivims: A Reply to 
David Dyzenhaus”, (2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 31, 32. 
53 J. Huysmans, “Minding Exceptions: The Politics of Insecurity and Liberal 
Democracy”, (2004) 3(3) Contemporary Political Theory 321, 329. 
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[A] reduction of the state to the moment of the decision, to a pure 
decision not based on reason and discussion and not justifying 
itself, that is, to an absolute decision created out of nothingness’. 
This nothingness refers to a normative vacuum, that is, absence of 
rule of law.54 (footnotes omitted). 
 
Michel Coutu and Marie-Hélène Giroux  contrast “normative” and 
“decisionist” legitimacy. The former is based on the rule of law and the 
compulsory character of legal norms. The latter is essentially political and 
alien to the rule of law.55 Thus, “petty sovereigns” within the government 
bureaucracy, rather than judges, make “pre-legal security decisions” for 
which they are not held to account.56 Clive Walker criticises decision-
making which is “in the hands of less experienced and more politically 
motivated government ministers as opposed to detached judges”.57 In the 
context of refugee law, Guy Goodwin-Gill argues against governments 
seeking to assume “potentially unaccountable power”, especially since 
9/11.58  
 
Even members of the judiciary criticise the executive. The House of 
Lords’ Lord Steyn spoke extra-judicially about the executive branch 
“often resort[ing] to excessive measures” and then added that the “litany 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 329 
55 M. Coutu and M-H. Giroux, “The Aftermath of September 11: Liberty v Security 
before the Supreme Court of Canada”, (2006) 18(2) International Journal of Refugee 
Law 313, 318. 
56 M. de Goede, “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, (2008) 
14(1) European Journal of International Relations 161, 176. 
57 C. Walker, “Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of 
Constitutionalism”, (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1395, 1402. 
58 G. Goodwin-Gill, “Refugees And Responsibility In The Twenty-First Century: More 
Lessons Learned From The South Pacific“ (2003) 12 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 
23, 30. 




of grave abuses of power by liberal democratic governments is too long to 
recount.”59 
 
We argue that such categorical statements reveal a lack of awareness about 
the history of deference by the judiciary in times of emergency; and a 
certain naïve expectation that the executive and the judiciary stand in 
opposition to each other with the judiciary displaying its true role as the 
guardian of individual human rights. 
 
Even Aradau and van Munster’s otherwise excellent insights exclude the 
judicial branch of government. They contrast administrative (executive) 
decision making seeking to eliminate all risk with “careful” juridical 
decision.60 They refer to the turn of precaution deployed by “managers of 
unease”, i.e., the executive government. One of their examples is Tony 
Blair’s explanation for reaching the decision to intervene in Iraq based on 
“intelligence”.61  
 
Aradau and van Munster go even further and claim that in some instances 
the logic of precaution is “impossible to accommodate by the juridical 
system.” They give the example of administrative detention where the 
burden of proof is on suspects, rather than on the authorities, to show that 
they are innocent of criminal acts.62 
                                                 
59 Lord Steyn, “Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Blackhole”, Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann 
Lecture, 25 November 2003, 2. Last accessed on 26 May at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf. 
60 C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking 
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International 
Relations 89, 106. 
61 T. Blair, (2004) Prime Minister Warns of Continuing Global Terror Threat. Prime 
Minister’s Speech, 5 March; http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page5461.asp as cited 
in C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking 
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International 
Relations 89, 105. 
62 C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking 
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International 
Relations 89, 106. 
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We wish to take the investigation of the dispositive of risk a step further to 
encompass courts as a rationality of government – through legal reasoning 
– and technology of government – through the powers the courts 
possess.63 We argue that the judicial system seeks to cope with the logic of 
precaution in exactly the same way as the other two branches of 
government. The cases we analyse indicate that precaution has become 
part of legal reasoning and, more often than not, judges do not express the 
view that their powers have been curtailed or that individual liberties have 
been sacrificed.  
 
 
C. THE JUDICIARY IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY AND THE TURN TO 
PRECAUTION 
 
For some observers the behaviour of courts since the war on terror 
commenced is neither new nor surprising. A number of legal scholars, 
analysing the role of courts from the American Civil War through to the 
post 9/11 era argue that “when faced with national crises, the judiciary 
tends to “go [] to war”64 and the “history of the judiciary in times of 
emergency and alleged emergency is a dismal one of judges deferring to 
executive claims.”65  
                                                 
63 We are not concerned with the distinction between “bio-powers” and the “juridical 
system of the law” as explained by F. Ewald, “Norms, Discipline and the Law,” (1990) 
30 Representations 138-161, 139. Juridical here refers to the power of courts. 
64 O. Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional”, (2003) 112, Yale Law Journal 1011, 1034. See also M. Tushnet, 
“Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, (2003) Wisconsin 
Law Review 273. Cf. D. Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and 
Individual Rights in Times of Crisis”, (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 2565. 
65 D. Dyzenhaus and R. Thwaites, “Legality and Emergency – The Judiciary in a Time of 
Terror” in A. Lynch, E. MacDonald and G. Williams (eds.), Law and Liberty in the War 
on Terror, Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007, 9-27, at 9. See also D. Bonner, 
“Checking the Executive? Detention Without Trial, Control Orders, Due Process and 
Human Rights”, (2006) 12(1) European Public Law 45. 





Oren Gross states that “when grave national crises are upon us, democratic 
nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the protection of human rights 
and civil liberties, indeed of basis and fundamental legal principles is 
concerned.”66 But he then goes on to propose an Extra-Legal Measures 
model in times of emergency allowing the executive to “deviate from 
existing legal principles, rules, and norms.”67  
 
In such times courts side with the executive and choose survival. The US 
and UK engaged in mass internment during the two World Wars and 
courts sanctioned it.68  
 
In the extra-judicial speech about Guantanamo Bay mentioned earlier Lord 
Steyn referred to a case where the House of Lords upheld the validity of a 
law under which a foreign national was interned in the UK during the 
Second World War:69 
 
Too often courts of law have denied the writ of the rule of law with 
only the most perfunctory examination. In the context of a war on 
terrorism without any end in prospect this is a sombre scene for 
human rights. But there is the caution that unchecked abuse of 
power begets ever greater abuse of power. And judges do have the 
                                                 
66 O. Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional”, (2003) 112, Yale Law Journal 1011, 1132. 
67 Ibid., 1111. 
68 M. Stibbe, “The Internment of Civilians by Belligerent States during the First World 
War and the Response of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, (2006) 41 
Journal of Contemporary History 5. See also D. Bonner, “Checking the Executive? 
Detention Without Trial, Control Orders, Due Process and Human Rights”, (2006) 12(1) 
European Public Law 45. 
69 Lord Steyn, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary of the House of Lords, “Guantanamo Bay: The 
Legal Blackhole”, Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann Lecture (25 November 2003), 2. Last 
accessed on 26 May at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf. The 
case was Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] AC 206. 
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duty, even in times of crisis, to guard against an unprincipled and 
exorbitant executive response. 
 
Preventative justice is evident not only in relation to anti-terrorism laws 
but also, for example, for the detention of dangerous offenders who may 
commit further offences if released.70 Seen from this perspective, Beck’s 
risk society theory does not have much to offer. One can analyse new 
terrorism laws as an extension of existing criminal laws to the new 
circumstances of terrorism, rather than a recent invention to cope with 
unprecedented catastrophic “bads” in risk society. For some time now 
there has been a general move towards prevention, precaution, preclusion, 
pre-emption or predetection from criminal law and immigration through to 
business and dieting. Court sanctioned preventative measures in various 
countries precede the war on terror.  
 
A Foucauldian analysis is somewhat more insightful than a risk society 
approach. Robert Castel wrote as early as 1991 that:71 
 
These preventative policies thus promote a new mode of 
surveillance: that of systematic predetection. This is a form of 
surveillance in the sense that the intended objective is that of 
anticipating and preventing the emergence of some undesirable 
event: illness, abnormality, deviant behaviour, etc. (italics in the 
original) 
 
One can go much further back in time. The German Criminal Code 
introduced preventive detention for dangerous criminals in 193372 and 
these provisions continue to be in use. Several other European states have 
                                                 
70 See Section, at 2.1. 
71 R. Castel, “From dangerousness to risk” ” in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller 
(eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1991, 281-298, 288. 
72 See the European Court of Human Rights decision as to admissibility in M v Germany, 
1 July 2008, Application no. 19359/04. At para 41. 




legislation allowing for the preventive detention of offenders of sound 
mind.73  
 
We argue that in some respects the war on terror is no more than the latest 
example of judges not protecting individuals against an unprincipled 
executive. Curiously, in a UK House of Lords case decided in October 
2001 – Rehman – the same Lord Steyn thought it self evident that in 
matters of national security courts must be deferential and give great 
weight to the views of the government.74 Lord Hoffmann held that 
whether or not something was “in the interests of national security” was a 
matter of judgment and policy and thus a matter for the executive, not for 
the judiciary, to determine.75 
 
The House of Lords in Rehman had reached its decision prior to 11 
September 2001, but the reasons were not published until October 2001. 
Some law lords added a postscript in this intervening period, underlining 
how deferential courts should be to the other two branches of 
government:76  
 
[S]uch decisions [relating to terrorism], with serious potential 
results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be 
conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the 
community through the democratic process.  
 
For Lord Slynn, the executive “is entitled to have regard to the 
precautionary and preventative principles” based on “material on which 
                                                 
73 Austria, Italy, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Slovakia and Switzerland. See the European 
Court of Human Rights decision as to admissibility in M v Germany, 1 July 2008, 
Application no. 19359/04. At para. 67. 
74 Ibid., Lord Steyn, [31]. 
75 Section 15(3) Immigration Act 1971. Rehman v Home Secretary [2001] UKHL 47, 
[50]. 
76 Ibid., Lord Hoffmann, [62]. 
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proportionately and reasonably [the executive] can conclude that there is a 
real possibility” of some harmful future acts.77 
 
According to Lord Steyn, in the context of the war on terrorism, and the 
relevant legislation, the appropriate standard of proof was that the person 
concerned may be (rather than more likely than not to be) a real threat to 
national security.78 Lord Hoffmann observed that “the whole concept of a 
standard of proof is not particularly helpful”.79 
 
In the more recent case of Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada expressed 
similar views, i.e., that courts should be deferential. Judicial review, the 
Court said, should only succeed where the Minister’s decision was 
patently unreasonable.80 In addition, the Court did not take issue with the 
decision of Parliament to set a low standard of proof.81  
 
Apart from the less than glorious history of the judiciary in times of crisis, 
we make a second criticism of observers who expect the courts to stand up 
for the rights of the individual. Constructing a simple opposition between 
the executive and judicial branch misses the point that the judiciary is part 
of government, that opposition “assumes law and force to be opposite and 
disregards the important implications of what Jacques Derrida calls the 
‘force of law’”.82 As Louise Amoore argues, within the logic of risk “it is 
                                                 
77 Ibid., Lord Slynn, [22]. 
78 Ibid., Lord Steyn, [29]. 
79 Ibid., Lord Hoffman, [56]. 
80 Suresh 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [32]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 25. 
81 The threat of danger to national security must be serious, meaning that “it must be 
grounded on objectively reasonable suspicion based on evidence and in the sense that the 
threatened harm must be substantial rather than negligible” Ibid., 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), 
[90]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 51. 
82 M. de Goede, “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe”, (2008) 
14(1) European Journal of International Relations 161, 179. 




not the case that “law recedes” as risk advances, but rather that law itself 
authorizes a specific and particular mode of risk management.”83 
 
The flurry of legislative and executive activity since 9/11 terrorism can be 
seen as the latest, and not unexpected, extension of existing criminal laws. 
Aims such as keeping dangerous criminals in prison, keeping immigrants, 
alleged terrorists or sex offenders “under control” have become a 
rationality of government in the manner in which members of the 
judiciary decide cases. Simultaneously, judicial decision making – such as 
the imposition of preventive detention or control orders – is a technology 
of government. It is one more step along the way of pre-emption, 
prevention or preclusion. In Section 2.1 of this article we look at 
preventative laws in various legal contexts in Australia, Canada and the 
UK. 
 
Courts often emphasise that in exercising their power they have to balance 
competing interests such as the interest of the state (sometimes its 
survival) or of the majority against an individual’s human rights.84 Some 
of the cases reviewed in Section 2 show that the judiciary does not reason 
in terms of a simple dichotomy – individual human rights versus state 
power. Instead, they refer to the human rights discourse but, ultimately, 
often arrive at an outcome where individual human rights are curtailed. 
There is a related problem, namely, the development of human rights law 
is lagging behind some of the more novel aspects of “preventative justice” 
eg, various means of restricting freedom of movement that do not amount 
to deprivation of liberty or non-punitive detention at after a person has 
served his sentence. We consider some of these issues under the heading 
human rights and precaution in Section 2.2. 
                                                 
83 L. Amoore, “Risk Before Justice: When the Law Contests its own Suspension”, (2008) 
21(4) Leiden Journal of International Law, 847-861, 850. 
84 The US Supreme Court’s Chief Justice Rehnquist said that in a “civilized society the 
most important task is achieving a proper balance between freedom and order. In 
wartime, reason and history both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor 
of order – in favor of the government’s ability to deal with conditions that threaten the 
national well-being”. W. H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime, 
1998, New York: Random House, 222-3 as cited in O. Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should 
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The turn to precaution and the perception of vulnerability affect the way in 
which governments and courts analyse global threats. The fight against 
terrorism – unknown unknowns – creates one more paradox. In traditional 
wars sovereign states fight against each other. In the global war on terror 
sovereign states seek to survive by taking global measures (eg passing of 
similar anti-terrorist laws or participating in a UN resolution). At the same 
time the threat, perceived or real, comes from non-state actors thus 
creating the need for states to take preventive measures of unknown 
efficacy against unknown for an unknown length of time. But the 
individuals who represent the global enemy are not unknown, or at least 
not unknowable. The enemy is the Muslim convert who happened to be in 
Afghanistan in 2001, the Muslim man who is in the UK and apparently 
wants to go to Iraq against Coalition troops; the Moroccan man who 
cannot give a satisfactory explanation for his trips from Canada. We return 
to these issues, the sovereignty-globalisation tension in the context of 
precaution, in the last part of Section 2, 2.3 entitled Sovereignty v global 
threats and solutions. 
 
II. PREVENTATIVE JUSTICE 
 
As pointed out in Section 1, some varieties of preventative justice have 
been around for a long time. In this section, we claim that the reach of the 
recent legislation is unprecedented and yet the judiciary has upheld the 
validity of these radical new laws. The cases we analyse relate to “control 
order” laws in Australia and the UK and certificates of inadmissibility 
(coupled with detention) in Canada.  
 
After 9/11 the UK and then the Australian Parliament passed “control 
order” legislation. It allows the executive (in the UK) or the judiciary (in 
Australia) to impose obligations such as staying inside one’s house for 12 
hours a day or more, prohibitions on the use of communication devices, a 
requirement to wear a tracking device and to report at specified times and 
places and so on.85 In Canada, a person can be declared “inadmissible” by 
                                                 
85 For the Australian legislation see Criminal Code 1995, Div 104, Section 104.5(3). For 
the UK legislation see Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. In Home Secretary v JJ [2007] 
UKHL 45 the obligations included remaining within one’s house/apartment for 18 hours 




the executive government86 on, inter alia, security grounds, i.e., for being 
engaged in terrorism, being a danger to the security of Canada, engaging 
in violence that might endanger the lives or safety of people in Canada, or 
being a member of a certain type of organisation.87 If the person is already 
in Canada (as opposed to a person trying to enter Canada), they can be 
detained and then deported. At an initial review, and periodic reviews 
thereafter,88 a court may release a person89 but impose conditions very 
similar to a “control order”.90 
 
It is not the aim of this article to judge whether such anticipatory measures 
achieve the results governments claim they seek to achieve, but we argue 
that preventive detention of serious convicted criminals, or refusing a 
crime suspect bail, is significantly different to the detention pursuant to 
this new variety of criminal preventive detention: the preventive measures 
                                                                                                                         
a day. When allowed out, between 10am to 4pm, the controlled persons were confined 
within an area not bigger than 72 km2. 
86 Two Ministers must sign the certificate. Section 77 of the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act 2002. 
Security certificates have existed as a part of Canadian law since the 1990s. As of early 
2007 a total of about twenty-seven (five after 11 September 2001) such certificates, had 
been issued. See J. Ip, “Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist 
Suspects”, (2007) 16 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 773, 802. 
87 An organization that there are reasonable grounds for believing has engaged, engages, 
or will engage in terrorist acts. 
88 Before the Supreme Court decision the detention of foreign nationals, ie, non 
permanent residents was mandatory upon the issuing of the inadmissibility certificate and 
a separate order was not necessary. The detention of foreign nationals was not reviewed 
within 48 hours. 
89 Sections 77(1) and 80 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002. There is a 
very large number of court cases brought by Mr Charkaoui, but it appears that the 
reasonableness of the security certificate has not been determined by a court. In the 2005 
case on detention the Court makes mention of the fact that the certificate has not been 
confirmed. Re Charkaoui (2005) FC 248, Noël J, [3]. 
90 Section 84 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002. 
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are against someone who has not committed a crime (or there is not 
enough evidence to charge them) and even against people who may never 
attempt to commit an offence. These laws do not go together with laws 
aimed at punishing. They are entirely targeted towards preventing 





In relation to criminal laws, in 2004 the High Court of Australia declared 
valid legislation allowing the detention of a sex offender who has served 
his or her sentence, but poses a risk of future offending.91 Both the 
detention of a convicted sex offender after the end of his or her sentence 
and the Criminal Code “control orders” are directed towards the future. A 
sex offender can only be kept in detention pursuant to “cogent evidence” 
and “to a high degree of probability” that they constitute an unacceptable 
risk92 having regard to psychiatric and other evidence.93 In addition, they 
have already been convicted of serious offences by a court satisfied of 
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
By contrast, the post 9/11 criminal legislation is almost entirely based on 
the precautionary principle, on the One Per Cent doctrine. To impose a 
control order the “issuing court” has to be satisfied only on the balance of 
probabilities that making it would substantially assist in preventing a 
terrorist act; or the person has provided training to, or received training 
from, a listed terrorist organisation; and the measures imposed (curfew, 
                                                 
91  Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33. Per Gleeson CJ, 206-207; 
[18]; per Gummow and Crennan JJ, 222, 229-230; [79], [114]-[121]; per Callinan J, 356-
357; [595]-[600]. In Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575 the High 
Court of Australia upheld the validity of legislation detaining sex offenders considered to 
be an “unacceptable risk”.  
92 Section 13(3)(a) and (b), Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). 
93 Section 13(4), Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). 




reporting conditions, etc) are reasonably necessary, and appropriate and 
adapted to protect the public from a terrorist act.94  
 
The relevant law was challenged in the case of Thomas v Mowbray.95 The 
case is unusual because the legislation in question provided that the court, 
not the executive, imposes the control orders.96 An “issuing court” had 
found97 that because of Mr Thomas’s association with Al-Qaida, he was 
“an available resource that can be tapped into” to commit terrorism 
offences. He was, according to the court, vulnerable and possibly 
susceptible to the views of extremists.98 The Court was therefore satisfied 
on the balance of probabilities that the measures imposed would serve the 
purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act. The 2006 control 
order imposed on Thomas included, inter alia, a condition that he not 
contact Osama bin Laden.99 
 
Mr Thomas argued in the High Court of Australia that the imposition of 
the order by the judiciary breached the separation of powers doctrine.100 
He argued further that the “issuing court” would have to exercise powers 
antithetical to the judicial function, i.e., it would have to make various 
predictions and conjectures instead of adjudicating on his guilt for past 
                                                 
94 Criminal Code 1995, Div 104, Section 104.4(c) and (d).  
95 (2007) 237 ALR 194 ; [2007] HCA 33.  
96 The Court referred to Mr Thomas’ argument that the legislation is invalid because it 
confers non-judicial power on courts as “curious”. Ibid., Callinan J, 355; [592].  
97 On the basis of the same evidence which in the criminal proceedings was held to have 
been improperly obtained. 
98 Jabbour v Thomas [2006] FMCA 1286 (27 August 2006). 
99 T. Allard, “Jihad Jack Wife Terror Link”, Sydney Morning Herald (29 August 2006). 
Last accessed on 8 July 2008 at http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/jihad-jack-wifes-
terror-link/2006/08/28/1156617275236.html  
100 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33. Per Gleeson CJ, 205; [15]. 
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acts. A majority of the Court rejected both of Mr Thomas’ lines of 
argument.101 
 
Chief Justice Gleeson, for example, found a reference to the concept of 
“preventive justice” dating back to the 18th century. The concept was 
discussed by the famous 18th century jurist Blackstone:102 
 
This preventive justice consists in obliging those persons, whom 
there is probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to 
stipulate with and to give full assurance to the public, that such 
offence as is apprehended shall not happen… 
 
In dismissing the argument that only criminal convictions should impose 
control order type restrictions, the majority justices drew various analogies 
with judicial orders where deprivation of liberty or other restraints are not 
incidental to the adjudication and punishing of criminal guilt for past 
behaviour such as an order for the continued detention of a sex offender, 
as discussed above.  
 
However, control orders are different in several key aspects. As Kirby J in 
his dissent in Thomas concluded, a person may be made subject to a 
control order:103 
 
[N]ot by reference to past conduct or even by reference to what 
that person himself might or might not do in the future. It is based 
entirely on a prediction of what is “reasonably necessary, and 
reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting 
the public from a terrorist act”, a vague, obscure and indeterminate 
                                                 
101 Kirby and Hayne JJ dissented. 
102 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (1769), Bk IV at 248 as cited in 
Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33, per Gleeson CJ, 205; [16]. 
See also per Gummow and Crennan JJ, 219-220; [73]-[77]; per Callinan J, 291-292; 
[591]-[600]. 
103 Ibid., Kirby J, 291-292; [354]. His view that the law may lead to “the loss of liberty, 
potentially extending to virtual house arrest” was not shared by the majority. Hayne J, 
328; [499], said the issuing court will have to engage in “prognostication”. 




criterion if ever there was one. [...] This invites the question: if the 
community of nations, with all of its powers and resources, cannot 
agree on what precisely “terrorism” is (and how it can be 
prevented), how can one expect a […] court in Australia to decide 
with consistency and in a principled (judicial) way what is 
reasonably necessary to protect the public from a terrorist act? 
 
Kirby J and the other dissenting justice, Hayne J, in separate reasons held 
that there was no ascertainable test or standard on the basis of which a 
court could decide whether to grant or refuse to make an order.104 The task 
that a court would perform was so indeterminate that it was not the 
exercise of judicial power.105 It was not appropriate for the judiciary to 
“consider future consequences the occurrence of which depends upon 
work done by police and intelligence services that is not known and 
cannot be known or predicted by the court.”106 Decision making would 
necessitate “evaluative judgments”, or the court’s “own idiosyncratic 
notion as to what is just”,107 in relation to “diffuse, fragmentary and even 
conflicting pieces of intelligence”, which should be done by the 
executive.108 It is “quintessentially” for the legislative and executive 
branches, not the judiciary, to decide how to protect the public for 
terrorism.109  
 
There was thus an implication even in the minority judgments, especially 
that of Justice Hayne, that it is reasonable for such a power to be exercised 
by the executive. With respect, whether a court or the executive exercises 
                                                 
104 Ibid., per Hayne J 321; [468]; per Kirby J, 281-282; [321]-[322]. 
105 Ibid., per Hayne J 327; [495]. 
106 Ibid., per Hayne J 323-324; [476]. 
107 Ibid., per Hayne J 332; [516]. 
108 Ibid., per Hayne J 330-331; [510]. 
109 Ibid., per Hayne J 329; [504]; per Kirby J, 280; [317]. 
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this type of power, it appears to be an instance of “decisionism”, or the 
application of the One Per Cent doctrine, by its very nature: 110  
 
[W]hen evidence is uncertain, the responsibility of the ‘suspected 
terrorist’ is a matter of decision. This decision is no longer the 
juridical decision for which careful consideration of evidence is 
necessary, but becomes an administrative decision, where the rule 
of zero risk takes precedence. 
 
Dyzenhaus and Thwaites criticise the minority justices for “exhibit[ing] an 
anachronistic attitude to the administrative state and to give up on the hope 
of having the rule of law control the war on terror”,111 although exactly 
how the court was supposed to “control the war on terror” was left 
unclear. As the same authors say, it might be that “preventative measures 
can never sufficiently conform to the rule of law to make them a legitimate 
measure for a constitutional state to adopt.”112 
 
The control order regime does not allow for deprivation of liberty as such. 
The majority in Thomas113 stated that detention (eg under the sex 
offenders legislation) “differs significantly in degree and quality from 
what may be entailed by observance of an interim control order”.114 But in 
his analysis of the Thomas decision Justin Gleeson has argued that the 
judiciary would probably uphold the validity of a (hypothetical) law 
                                                 
110 C. Aradau and R. van Munster “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking 
Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future“, (2007) 13(1) European Journal of International 
Relations 89, 106. 
111 D. Dyzenhaus and R. Thwaites, “Legality and Emergency – The Judiciary in a Time 
of Terror” in A. Lynch, E. MacDonald and G. Williams (eds.), Law and Liberty in the 
War on Terror, Sydney: The Federation Press, 2007, 9-27, 24. 
112 Ibid., 18. 
113 As mentioned above, footnote 103, in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; 
[2007] HCA 33, Kirby J, 291-292; [354], considered that a control order may amount to 
deprivation of liberty in some circumstances. 
114 Ibid., Gummow and Crennan JJ, 229; [116]. Cf J. Renwick, “Counter Terrorism and 
Australian Law” (2007) 3(3) Security Challenges 67, 73. 




authorising the detention/imprisonment of a person upon proof that he or 
she is a member of a proscribed organisation as long as the court forms a 




The Supreme Court of Canada upheld preventive, criminal detention 
legislation relating to convicted dangerous offenders as far back as 1987, 
but remarked that detention for the sole purpose of preventing the 
commission of a future offence would violate the Charter.116 In 2007 in the 
case of Charkaoui v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration)117 the 
Supreme Court “adapted” the purpose of the legislation to the migration 
law context and concluded that the periodic review of the detention by a 
court meant that the law in question did not contravene the Charter as the 
review meant that detention was not indefinite.118 The Supreme Court 
added that “foreign nationals can apply for release and depart from Canada 
at any time.”119 The Court found that there was a rational foundation for 
the detention of foreign, namely, the signing of a certificate that he or she 
was a danger.120 
 
In Charkaou a Canadian permanent resident and another person, a 
“foreign national”, argued that the law breached certain provisions of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
                                                 
115 J. Gleeson, “Thomas v Mowbray”, Paper presented at ANU 12th annual public law 
weekend, 11 November 2007. Last accessed on 1 May 2008 at 
http://www.banco.net.au/pdf/j-g_articles/ThomasEvMowbrayPaper11_11.pdf, 16-17.  
116 R. v Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309, per LaForest J, 327-28. 
117 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) (Charkaoui) 2007 SCC 9; [2007] 
1 S.C.R. 350. 
118 Ibid., [107] and [127]; 408 and 415. 
119 Ibid., [90]; 401-402. 
120 Ibid., [89]; 401.. 
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The case is another excellent example of the logic of precaution in action. 
The matter went through several courts before reaching the Supreme 
Court. Some of the courts emphasised the need to employ the 
precautionary approach in national security matters:121 
 
Situations and entities that pose a threat to national security are 
often difficult to detect and are designed to strike where society is 
most vulnerable. Attacks against national security can have tragic 
consequences. People who pose a danger to national security are 
[...] difficult to identify and their borderless networks are often 
difficult to infiltrate. They strike when least expected. Where 
national security is involved, we must do everything possible to 
avert catastrophe. The emphasis must be on prevention. After all, 
the security of the state and the public are at stake. Once certain 
acts are perpetrated, it could be too late.  
 
In 2003 Mr Charkaoui found himself detained after the executive issued an 
“inadmissibility” certificate and the Federal Court agreed that Mr 
Charkaoui continued to be a danger to Canada’s national security. The 
Federal Court said that the executive “linked” Mr Charkaoui to 
violence.122 The “link” was that Mr Charkaoui was a karate enthusiast:  
 
In the past, it has been observed that some individuals involved 
with Al-Qaeda are devoted to the practice of karate and/or the 
martial arts. In particular Ziard Jarrah, who was part of the group 
that hijacked American Airlines Flight 93, had trained in the 
martial arts in preparation for the September 11, 2001 operation. 
 
The Federal Court seemed to accept the logic of the executive, even 
though an interest in karate in itself is not proof of anything; this fact 
acquired a certain significance when taken together with other facts eg the 
fact that Mr Charkaoui is a Muslim and from Morocco, rather than, for 
example a Zen Buddhist from Japan.  
                                                 
121 Charkaoui 2003 FC 1419 (CanLII), [126]. 
122 Re Charkaoui, 2003 FC 882 (CanLII), [50]; [2004] 1 F.C.R. 528, 548-9. 





This is an example of the “prosaic” or “banal face of pre-emption” based 
on everyday activities or interests.123 The Court applied the logic of radical 
precaution further. The lack of evidence that Mr Charkaoui plans to 
commit a crime turns into sinister evidence that he is a “sleeper agent”. 
The Court accepted that the executive “expressly and unequivocally 
associate[d] the [Mr Charkaoui] with a sleeper agent in the bin Laden 
network”124 despite the total lack of positive evidence of such 
“membership” or “association”.125  
 
In a subsequent hearing in 2004 the Court had “difficulty seeing any 
conceivable conditions that might neutralize this serious danger“, 
whatever the danger might be.126 Somehow, the onus was on Mr 
Charkaoui to present evidence “that might allow [the Court] an 
understanding of this danger“ and since Mr Charkaoui failed to do so the 
Court could not see how the danger could be “alleviated or neutralized.”127 
In 2005, after the fourth detention review, Mr Charkaoui was released 
from detention,128. The Court imposed severe restrictions on Mr 
Charkaoui’s freedom of movement, equivalent to control orders in 
Australia and the UK,129 to ensure that the “neutrality” of the danger 
                                                 
123 L. Amoore and M. de Goede, “Transactions after 9/11: the banal face of the 
preemptive strike” (2008) 33(2) Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 173-
185, 174. 
124 Re Charkaoui, 2003 FC 882 (CanLII), [51]; [2004] 1 F.C.R. 528, 549. 
125 Ibid., [13]; 537. 
126 Re Charkaoui 2004 FC 1031 (CanLII), [39] 
127 Ibid., [39] 
128 Re Charkaoui 2005 FC 248 (CanLII), [1]; (2005), 3 F.C.R. 389, 394-5. 
129 Curfew for 11 ½ hours a day, and at other times Mr Charkaoui had to be accompanied, 
wear an electronic tag; could not use of communication devices, etc. Ibid.,[86]; 422-23. 
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continued.130 The “danger” had somehow inexplicably not only decreased, 




The UK control order legislation purports to be in accordance with the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence 
makes it clear that Art 5 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to 
liberty and security of the person, does not permit preventative deprivation 
of liberty, not even to prevent the commission of a terrorist act.132 
 
However, preventative restrictions on the freedom of movement may not 
contravene Art 5 of the ECHR, where they do not amount to deprivation 
of liberty. In Labita, restrictions were imposed on a person considered 
“dangerous” because suspected (“on the basis of inferences, full proof 
being required only to secure a conviction”)133 of being a member of the 
Mafia. The ECtHR agreed with the Italian court: 134 
 
[I]t is legitimate for preventive measures, including special 
supervision, to be taken against persons suspected of being 
members of the Mafia, even prior to conviction, as they are 
intended to prevent crimes being committed. Furthermore, an 
acquittal does not necessarily deprive such measures of all 
foundation, as concrete evidence gathered at trial, though 
insufficient to secure a conviction, may nonetheless justify 
                                                 
130 Ibid., [83]; 422. 
131 Ibid.,[75]; 420. 
132 See Art 5(1)(b) and Engel v Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A, No 22 
(1979-80) 1 EHRR 647, [69]. 
133 Labita v Italy, judgment of 6 April 2000, application No. 26772/95, [65]. 
134 Ibid., [195]. 




reasonable fears that the person concerned may in the future 
commit criminal offences. 
 
As long as the restrictions are not severe enough to amount to deprivation 
of liberty, they are permissible.135 
 
Under the post 9/11 UK legislation the Home Secretary (the executive) 
can make a control order if he or she has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that an individual is involved in terrorism-related activity, and 
consider that it is necessary to make a control order imposing obligations 
on that individual in order to protect the public from a risk of terrorism.136 
This is subject to judicial review.137  
 
The argument that control orders constitute “deprivation of liberty”, 
contrary to Art 5 of the ECHR was argued in Home Secretary v JJ, Home 
Secretary v MB and Home Secretary v E.138  
 
In Home Secretary v JJ139 the House of Lords followed the jurisprudence 
of the ECHR with respect to what constitutes deprivation of liberty: there 
is no bright line, only a difference of degree and intensity, between 
deprivation of liberty and restriction or control which would not engage 
Art 5(1).140 In deciding on which side of the line a control order falls, a 
court takes account of matters such as the type, duration, effects and 
manner of implementation of the measure in question. Each case depends 
                                                 
135 Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention guarantees freedom of movement. The 
control orders may be in breach of this provision but the UK is not a party to the Protocol. 
136 Section 2(1). 
137 Sections 3(2), (10) and (11). 
138 Home Secretary v JJ [2007] UKHL 45; Home Secretary v MB [2007] UKHL 46; 
Home Secretary v E [2007] UKHL 47. 
139 [2007] UKHL 45. 
140 Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the Convention guarantees freedom of movement. The UK is 
not a party to the Protocol. 
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on its own facts.141 A majority of the House of Lords found that the 
measures (including an 18-hour “curfew”) clearly amounted to deprivation 
of liberty.  
 
However, in Home Secretary v MB142 the House of Lords held that 
restrictions, which included a 14 hour curfew and confinement within a 23 
km2 area the rest of the time, did not breach Art 5.143 In the words of 
Louise Amoore, borrowing from Foucault “the individual already 
resembles the crime before he has committed it”. The courts deploy a 
“calculative practice” “before a crime takes place, in order to see or to 
envisage the individual as criminal.”144 Louise Amoore refers to the “legal 
screen” that is, the law’s “intrinsic role in determining ‘the way in which 
we see and are given to the world to be seen’ … If the legal screen is 
interposed between the world of data, facts, and evidence and the making 
of social, political and legal judgements and decisions, then pre-emptive 
evidence may itself be authenticated.”145 
                                                 
141 The classical “borderline” case is Guzzardi v. Italy, judgment of 6 November 1980, 
Series A, No.39 (1981) 3 EHRR 533. The Italian government kept Mr Guzzardi on a 
small island while criminal proceedings against him were ongoing. On the facts of the 
case the ECHR said that the cumulative effect of all the restrictions imposed on Mr 
Guzzardi amounted to deprivation of liberty. The restrictions were containment for 16 
months within a very small area on an island, with a nine-hour overnight curfew in 
dilapidated accommodation, without social contact, subject to strict supervision with 
obligations to report to the authorities twice daily, to inform them of anyone whom he 
wished to telephone, and to seek permission before visiting the mainland. On the other 
hand, house arrest for 12 hours each weekday and the whole weekend was held to be 
restriction on movement (Trijonis v. Lithuania, judgment of 17 March 2005, application 
No. 23333/02), as was a ten-hour curfew with a requirement not to leave home without 
telling the police (Raimondo v Italy, judgment of 22 February 1994, Series A, No.281-A 
(1994) 18 EHRR 237). 
142 [2007] UKHL 46; [2007] 3 W.L.R. 681. 
143 Ibid., eg, Lord Bingham, [11]. 
144 L. Amoore, “Vigilant Visualities: The Watchful Politics of the War on Terror”, (2007) 
38 Security Dialogue 215, 221. 
145 L. Amoore, “Risk Before Justice: When the Law Contests its own Suspension”, (2008) 
21(4) Leiden Journal of International Law, 847-861, 857. 




III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRECAUTION 
 
In this section our interest is twofold: Firstly, on the tendency of 
governments, and the courts, to curtail civil liberties in times of 
emergency. Secondly, on the inability of the human rights discourse to 
keep up with the discourse of risk society and precaution. The protection 
of human rights and the deployment of precautionary measures are 
dissociated, thus enabling courts to deploy precautionary measures while 




Prima facie, compared to the Canadian and UK cases analysed further 
below, Haneef a 2007 case, appears a rare example of a case where the 
human rights discourse seemed to be well equipped to deal with the 
exigency of the ‘war on terror’. Dr Haneef’s visa was cancelled by 
Australia’s executive government146 after cousins of his were arrested and 
charged in relation to terrorism offences in the UK. He himself was 
arrested in Australia147 and charged with having intentionally provided 
resources – a mobile phone SIM card – to a terrorist organisation.148 
 
The cancellation was on the basis that the Minister for Immigration 
reasonably suspected that Dr Haneef did not pass the “character test”.149 
                                                 
146 MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [15]-[17]; (2007) 163 FCR 414, 418. 
147 Ibid., [7]-[8], [10]; 416-7.  
Section 102.7 of the Criminal Code (Cth), the same Code under which a court imposed a 
control order on Mr. Thomas. See Chapter 2, 2.1. 
148 MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [13]; (2007) 163 FCR 414, 417. 
149 Section 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (reproduced in Annex B). The 
“character test” allows the Minister to refuse or cancel a visa where a person has, for 
example, committed a serious crime and therefore does not “pass the character test”. 
Haneef v MIAC [2007] FCA 1273, [101]; (2007) 161 FCR 40, 59. 
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The Federal Court found in Dr Haneef’s favour as did the Full Bench of 
the Federal Court.150 
 
These two cases are remarkable and ordinary at the same time. They are 
notable for their discussion of the importance of the judicial branch of 
government (especially the first instance decision) and fundamental rights 
(especially the appeal decision) and for the fact that they reinstated Dr 
Haneef’s visa. The expression “rule of law” appears more than 20 times. 
Expressions such as “the war on terror” or “fight against terrorism” do not 
appear at all. The courts’ legal reasons are measured and formulated in a 
way that makes the political context fade in the background. Their 
apparent ordinariness makes them remarkable. 
 
The first instance decision starts with a long and vigorous defence of the 
Federal Court’s jurisdiction and power.151 His Honour speaks of the rule 
of law152 and the “embedded constitutional guarantee that persons will be 
dealt with according to law”.153 The judiciary has an important role to play 
and “each of the arms of government [including the executive] must pay 
due deference to, and not to intrude upon, the roles of the other arms of 
government.”154 The executive’s heavy responsibility in national security 
matters,155 the Minister’s accountability to Parliament or the government’s 
accountability to the electorate cannot give the Minister the right to act 
outside of his powers.156  
                                                 
150 MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203; (2007) 163 FCR 414. 
151 Haneef v MIAC [2007] FCA 1273, [5]-[68]; 161 FCR 40, 43-53. Dr Haneef’s right of 
judicial review was not in doubt and there was no obvious legal reason to explain or 
defend the Court’s role. 
152 Ibid., [9]; 44. 
153 Ibid.,[19]; 45. 
154 Ibid., [31]; 47. 
155 Ibid., [32]; 47 
156 Ibid., [68]; 53. 





On appeal, the Full Bench of Federal Court referred to the principles that 
Acts should be construed, where possible, so as not to infringe on common 
law rights and freedoms.157 The Court remarked that Dr Haneef had 
valuable rights in Australia.158  
 
The Court at first instance denied that this was “a bout between a section 
of the judiciary and the executive”, but referred to an extra-judicial speech 
by Lord Bingham in which he spoke of “an inevitable” and “entirely 
proper tension” between the executive and the judiciary, especially “at 
times of perceived threats to national security” and the judiciary’s duty “to 
require that [the executive] go no further must be performed if the rule of 
law is to be observed.”159 
 
The Court held that the Minister had misconstrued the expression “an 
association with”160 that it should not “construe words widely to allow 
them to apply to persons of good character when a narrower construction 
which would exclude such persons is open.”161 The Full Court agreed and 
held that the legislation should be construed narrowly to exclude persons 
who have innocent associations.162 
                                                 
157 MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [107]; (2007) 163 FCR 414, 442-43.  
158 Ibid., [110]; 443. 
159 Lord Bingham, ???????????????????, 28 as cited in Haneef v MIAC [2007] FCA 1273, 
[58]; (2007) 161 FCR 40, 52. 
160 Spender J said the case was about the construction of the provision that “a person does 
not pass the character test if: ... the person has or has had an association with someone 
else, or with a group or organisation, whom the Minister reasonably suspects has been or 
is involved in criminal conduct.” 
This explanatory statement is not part of the reported decision and has no numbered 
paragraphs; it is only available on the online version. 
161 MIAC v Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [128]; (2007) 163 FCR 414, 447. 
162 Ibid., [128]; 447. 
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Writing in the context of Canadian legislation Craig Forcese says:163 
 
At core, however, the fundamental pre-requisite to […] limiting 
interpretation is meaningful access to courts willing to probe 
carefully government claims of national security. The rules of 
statutory interpretation do not prescribe mechanical outcomes. 
 
Is this a rare example of the judiciary keeping the executive in check? 
Arguably, yes, within the limited scope of what a court can do in judicial 
review proceeding. As Vivienne Jabri puts it, the judiciary is part of the 
“grammar” of the legislation and “the locations in which such articulations 
of dissent from sovereign power take place are severely limited”.164 Both 
Courts accepted that on the available evidence and applying the correct 
legal test the Minister could have reached the same conclusion and could 
probably make the same decision, while within his power, in the future.165  
 
Furthermore, without wishing to sound too cynical, we may also observe 
that Dr Haneef faced no criminal charges and it became clear very quickly 
that he had no more than an innocent association (being a cousin) of 
people involved in terrorist plots. Therefore, there was also no room for 





                                                 
163 C. Forcese, “Through a Glass Darkly: The Role and Review of “National Security” 
Concepts in Canadian Law”, (2006) 43 Alberta Law Review 963, 981. 
164 V. Jabri, “The Limits of Agency in Times of Emergency” in J. Huysmans, A. Dobson 
and R. Prokhovnik (eds.) The Politics of Protection. Sites of Insecurity and Political 
Agency, New York: Routledge, 2006, 136, 147. 
165 Haneef v MIAC [2007] FCA 1273, [261]-[264]; (2007) 161 FCR 40, 86. MIAC v 
Haneef [2007] FCAFC 203, [133]-[135]; (2007) 163 FCR 414 448-49. 






In Charkaoui, discussed above, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasised 
that “in a constitutional democracy, governments must act accountably 
and in conformity with the Constitution and the rights and liberties it 
guarantees.”166 The Supreme Court held that the use of evidence not 
disclosed to the certified person, without a counter-balancing mechanism 
(the Court recommended the introduction of a special advocate)167 was a 
violation of s7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’, the 
guarantee of fundamental justice.168 Mr Charkaoui’s co-appellant argued 
successfully that the Court held that the law should apply equally to 
“foreign nationals” like him and “permanent residents” like Mr 
Charkaoui.169  
 
Was this a victory for human right and the rule of law against an 
overreaching executive, a sign of “an attitude of scepticism” towards 
certain policies in the war on terrorism?170  
 
Not necessarily. Procedural changes to the law were found to be sufficient 
to make it comply with the Canadian Charter. The Court rejected all the 
other human rights arguments raised by Mr Charkaoui and his co-
appellant. For example, it held that extended periods of detention do not 
                                                 
166 Charkaoui 2007 SCC 9 (CanLII), [1]; 1 S.C.R. 350, 362-63. 
167 Ibid., [70]-[87]; 392-400. 
168 By contrast, the Federal Court at first instance had strongly defended the legislation 
and asked rhetorically: “Are more appropriate procedures truly conceivable?”: Charkaoui 
2003 FC 1419 (CanLII), [119]. 
169 A foreign national’s, as opposed to a permanent residents such as certificate was not 
reviewable for 120 days after a judge confirms its reasonableness. Sections 82(2) and 
84(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2002. 
170 T. Poole, “Recent Developments in the ‘War on Terrorism’ in Canada”, (2007) 7(3) 
Human Rights Law Review 633, 633.  
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breach the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment171 or a common 
law (rule of law) prohibition on detention on the basis of an executive 
decision.172 It held that judges reviewing orders were non-deferential and 
are not perceived to be “in the camp” of the executive.173 
 
Further, one of the lower courts expressly criticised Mr Charkaoui for 
claiming that his individual human rights were absolute:174 
 
The individual right to liberty [...] no longer has much meaning or 
scope when, collectively, the society charged with ensuring its 
protection has lost its own right to liberty and security as a result of 
terrorist activities that it was powerless to prevent or eradicate 
owing to this individual right that it was to protect and intended to 
protect. The choice […] “is not between order and liberty. It is 
between liberty with order and anarchy without either.” 
 
Similarly, in Suresh, a 2002 Supreme Court of Canada decision, it was 
held that deportation to torture may be justified in some circumstances 
where a person is a danger to national security, even though the Court 
underlined the importance of ensuring that175  
 
legal tools do not undermine values that are fundamental to our 
democratic society -- liberty, the rule of law, and the principles of 
fundamental justice --values that lie at the heart of the Canadian 
constitutional order and the international instruments that Canada 
has signed. In the end, it would be a Pyrrhic victory if terrorism 
                                                 
171 Section 12 of the Charter. Re Charkaoui 2007 SCC 9 (CanLII), [95]-[117]; 1 S.C.R. 
350, 403-12. 
172 Ibid., [137]; 418. 
173 Ibid., [42]; 379. 
174 Charkaoui 2004 FCA 421 (CanLII), [100].  
175 Suresh 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [4]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 13. 




were defeated at the cost of sacrificing our commitment to those 
values. 
 
The Federal Court of Appeal (the Court below the Supreme Court) held 
that deportation, even to torture, was a proportionate response to the 
pressing objective of preventing Canada from becoming a haven for 
terrorism. Expelling Mr Suresh would “not shock the conscience” of most 
Canadians:176 
 
Suspected terrorists cannot lay claim to an expectation that the 
Charter will protect them against refoulement simply because they 
have been successful in penetrating our borders. Those who are 
prepared to participate in political reform by way of terrorism 
freely accept the risks which flow from this form of expression, 
including death. It is not refoulement by the Canadian government 
which exposes persons to the risk of torture, rather it is the pursuit 
of political goals through terrorism which is the true causa 
causans. Canada is neither the first nor last link in the chain of 
causation giving rise to torture. The first link is the suspected 
terrorist. The last link is the country of refoulement. Canada is 
merely an involuntary intermediary. 
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the view that Canada was no more 
than “an involuntary intermediary”; nonetheless it held that in 
“exceptional circumstances” a person may be expelled to face torture 
elsewhere.177  
 
Michel Coutu and Marie-Hélène Giroux have argued that post 9/11 there 
has been a paradigm shift from liberty to security in judicial decision 
making and criticise Suresh itself for being a Pyrrhic victory.178 They 
                                                 
176 Suresh 2000 (CanLII) 17101, [120]. 
177 “The ambit of an exceptional discretion to deport to torture, if any, must await future 
cases.” Suresh 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [78]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 46-47. 
178 M. Coutu and M.-H. Giroux, “The Aftermath of September 11: Liberty v Security 
before the Supreme Court of Canada”, (2006) 18(2) International Journal of Refugee 
Law 313, 313-14 and 323 respectively. 
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compare Suresh with the case of Burns179 decided only about a year 
earlier, an extradition case in which a crime suspect could have faced the 
death penalty in the US. The Court did not allow the extradition after 
declining to treat the executive’s discretion with the “utmost 
circumspection” as it had been prepared to earlier (eg, in Kindler a 1991 
case).180 In Burns the Court said it was not trying to dictate foreign policy 
to the executive, but had to fulfil its duty as the guardian of the 
Constitution.181  
 
One possible explanation for the difference between Suresh and Burns is 
the proliferation of precautionary reasoning since 9/11. In Burns the Court 
emphasised its own role as a guardian of the Constitution and individual 
human rights. By contrast, in Suresh it spoke of the executive and 
parliament’s duty to do what they can to combat terrorism: 182  
 
Governments, expressing the will of the governed, need the legal 
tools to face the manifest evil of terrorism and the random and 
arbitrary taking of innocent lives, rippling out in an ever widening 





In Home Secretary v JJ (a case already examined above), the human rights 
discourse was present but the House of Lords did not address the 
underlying question of the orders’ effectiveness directly:183 
                                                 
179 United States v. Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283. 
180 Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice) [1991] 2 SCR 779, per LaForest, 837. 
181 United States v. Burns [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, [35]. 
182 Suresh 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [3]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 12. 
183 Home Secretary v JJ [2007] UKHL 45, Lord Brown, [86]. 




Control orders are highly contentious. Many think them essential 
as a means of providing some protection at least against suspected 
terrorists, the very minimum which government should do in 
fulfilment of its undoubted obligation to safeguard public security. 
Others abhor the whole notion of preventive action against people 
not even to be charged with a criminal offence and question 
whether the control order regime, like internment in the past, does 
not create more terrorists than it disables. That, however, is a 
debate for the House in its legislative capacity, not for your 
Lordships in the Appellate Committee. 
 
As mentioned in 2.1 in Home Secretary v MB,184 the controlees argued a 
breach of Art 5 of the ECHR. They further argued a breach of Art 6, right 
to a fair trial.185 MB succeeded at first instance before the High Court.186 
The Court criticised both the low standard necessary for the order to be 
made by the executive – “reasonable grounds for suspicion”,187 based on 
evidence which was not disclosed to the controlee, and the low standard 
necessary for the order to be confirmed by a court – that the order is not 
“flawed”.188 Further, according to Sullivan J, the role of the court pursuant 
to the PTA was too limited – it allowed for judicial review, whereas Art 6 
of the Convention requires full merits review.189 Sullivan J concluded that 
the legislation was incompatible with Art 6 of the Convention:190 
                                                 
184 [2007] UKHL 46. 
185 The House of Lords held that the proceedings were civil, not criminal, and therefore 
the more exhaustive provisions of Art 6(3) of the European Convention did not apply. 
See Home Secretary v MB [2007] UKHL 46, Lord Bingham, [24]; Lord Hoffmann, [48].  
186 High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Sullivan J. MB v Home Secretary [2006] EWHC 
1000. 
187 Ibid., [51]. 
188 Sections 3(10) and (11) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. MB v Home 
Secretary [2006] EWHC 1000, [86]. 
189 MB v Home Secretary [2006] EWHC 1000, [79]. 
190 Ibid., [103]. 
 
 
44                                     CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 05 NO. 01 
 
The thin veneer of legality which is sought to be applied … cannot 
disguise the reality. That controlees’ rights under the Convention 
are being determined not by an independent court in compliance 
with Article 6.1, but by executive decision-making, untrammelled 
by any prospect of effective judicial supervision. 
 
In the House of Lords Lord Brown, for example, spoke of the right to a 
fair hearing, Art 6, as “not merely an absolute right but one of altogether 
too great importance to be sacrificed on the altar of terrorism control”.191 
Yet in the end, rather than declare the law incompatible with the Human 
Rights Act and the ECHR, the House of Lords opted for a practical 
solution on a case by case basis which would achieve compliance with Art 
6.192  
 
IV. SOVEREIGNTY V GLOBAL THREATS AND 
SOLUTIONS 
 
By definition, states seek to assert their sovereignty when they feel 
threatened. Whether it is the fear of immigration, war or terrorism, it 
always concerns an outside threat. What is new with the war on terrorism 
is that there is no conventional war as such (if one puts aside the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan), it is of indefinite duration, the rules of engagement 
are unclear and the enemy appears impossible to identify. But perhaps, 
once the precautionary principles come into play, the enemy can be 
identified. The Muslim karate enthusiast in Canada, the white Australian 
Muslim who was in Afghanistan on 9/11 and the Tamil from Sri Lanka 
have nothing at all in common other than the fact that they are perceived 
(or represented for everyone to see as) the potential terrorist whose control 
or detention is necessary to prevent a potential disaster. Below, we explore 
some of the paradoxes relating to Western states’ attempts to assert 
sovereignty and how they go about identifying those who pose a threat. 
 
                                                 
191 Home Secretary v MB [2007] UKHL 46, Lord Brown, [91]. 
192 Ibid., Baroness Hale, [66]. See also Lord Bingham, [35]. 




A. AUSTRALIA  
 
The tension between sovereignty and global threats is nicely encapsulated 
by the case of Thomas v Mowbray.193 The Australian Constitution contains 
heads of power which limit the Federal Parliament’s legislative power. Mr 
Thomas argued that neither the “defence” nor the “external affairs” power 
supported the legislation in question.194 
 
One of the most famous constitutional law cases in Australian legal 
history, the Communist Party Case,195 concerned the Australian 
government’s unsuccessful attempt to ban the Communist Party of 
Australia.196 The Cold War was at its height, yet the High Court analysed 
the legislation as if a “state of peace ostensibly existed“.197 The Court 
stated further that the central purpose of the defence power in the 
Constitution (“the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and 
of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain 
the laws of the Commonwealth“)198 was the protection of the state from 
external enemies:199 “war and the possibility of war with an extra-
Australian nation or organism”.200 Only the “supreme emergency of war 
                                                 
193 (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33. 
194 The government argued that apart from the defence and external affairs powe, three 
more powers supported the legislation. See Ibid. per KirbyJ 244; [183]. 
195 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1.  
 
196 The law was popular with the public and the press. One newspaper referred to the Bill 
as a “Drastic Remedy for Cancer”. Canberra Times (28 April 1950), 4 as cited in G. 
Winterton, 'The Significance of the Communist Party Case' (1992) 18 Melbourne 
University Law Review 630, 643. 
197 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, Dixon J, 196.  
198 Section 51(vi) of the Australian Constitution.  
199 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, Dixon J, 194. 
200 Ibid., Fullagar J, 259. 
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itself“201 could have supported the law in question and thus it was declared 
unconstitutional.202.  
 
In Thomas, some 55 years later, the executive government argued that the 
risks associated with terrorism meant that the law was supported by the 
“defence power” (sovereignty) as well as the “external affairs” power 
because terrorism affects other states as well as Australia’s relations with 
other states (global threat and global fight against it).203  
 
Six out of the seven High Court justices agreed. The proscription of 
terrorist acts, they concluded, “falls within a central conception of the 
defence power.”204 A majority held that the defence power was not limited 
to aggression from a foreign state, but instead included non-state actors 
and internal threats.205 The defence power could be invoked “while 
terrorism of the kind proved here remains a threat”206 in order to support 
laws “aimed at anticipating and avoiding the infliction of suffering.”207 
(italics added). 
 
                                                 
201 Ibid., Dixon J, 198. 
202 Ibid., Dixon J, 195.  
203 Australian Constitution, section 51(xxix). The “external affairs” power is not defined 
in the Australian Constitution. It is simply the power to make laws with respect to 
“external affairs”. 
204 Unlike many of the cases from the First and Second World War, which examined 
whether there was a sufficient connection between defence and the subject matter of the 
law in question (eg,. controlling the price of bread). Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 
194; [2007] HCA 33, per Gummow and Crennan, 235; [146]. 
205 Ibid., Gleeson CJ, 202; [7]; Gummow and Crennan JJ, 234; [141]; Hayne, J, 314-315; 
[438]-[439]; Callinan J, 353; [583]. 
206 Ibid ,Callinan J, 355; [590]. 
207 Thomas v Mowbray, [2007] HCA 33, Gummow and Crennan, 235, [145]. 




Callinan J expressly criticised the Communist Party Case and commented 
that the sole dissenting judge in that case208 had probably been more 
perceptive “to the gravity of direct and indirect internal threats inspired 
externally, and the different manifestations of war and warfare in an 
unsettled and dangerous world.”209 By contrast, the majority in that case 
had, according to his Honour, shown210 
 
both a preoccupation with the events of the recent past [the Second 
World War], of a declared war, uniformed, readily distinguishable 
external enemies, generally culturally, ethnically, ideologically and 
religiously homogenous states, and an incomplete appreciation, 
despite Hiroshima and Nagasaki, of the potential of weaponry for 
massive harm. 
 
In relation to the external affairs power Gummow and Crennan JJ 
expressed the view that since the definition of “terrorist act” in the 
Criminal Code included instances in which the object of coercion or 
intimidation may be the government or public of a foreign country, 
therefore the “external affairs” power supported the legislation.211 The law 
                                                 
208 Ibid. Chief Justice Latham would have upheld the validity of the law. In his dissenting 
judgment his Honour said at 156: 
“The Court may, I think, allow itself to be sufficiently informed of affairs to be aware 
that any peace which now exists is uneasy and is considered by many informed people to 
be very precarious, and that many of the nations of the world (whether rightly or 
wrongly) are highly apprehensive. To say that the present condition of the world is one of 
"peace" may not unfairly be described as an unreal application of what has become an 
outmoded category. The phrases now used are "incidents", "affairs", "police action", 
"cold war". The Government and Parliament do not regard the present position as one of 
perfect peace and settled security, and they know more about it than the courts can 
possibly know as the result of considering legally admissible evidence.” 
209 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33, per Callinan J, [589]. 
210 Ibid., Callinan, 353; [583]. 
211 This is not part of the ratio decidendi of the case because only three justices expressly 
stated that the external affairs power supported the legislation. Ibid., Gummow and 
Crennan JJ, 236; [149]-[150]. Gleeson CJ agreed that the external affairs power sustained 
the legislation, 202; [6]. 
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in question was with respect to matters affecting relations with other 
countries.  
 
Without explaining what justified the different contemporary 
interpretation, their Honours concluded that the commission of a “terrorist 
act” as defined in the law was “now, even if it has not been in the past” a 
matter which could affect Australia’s relations with other nations. Since 
2001 terrorism in one country has consequences for other countries, 
including that “preventive or precautionary state action may be justified; 





In Suresh213 the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether to expel a 
refugee who may be at risk of torture in his home country because he is a 
“danger to the security of the country” of Canada.214  
 
Mr Suresh, an ethnic Tamil from Sri Lanka, argued that deportation to 
torture would breach the Canadian Charter of Rights215 and that the words 
                                                 
212 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), 
[88], [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 50 as cited in Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33, Gummow and 
Crennan JJ, 236-237; [152]-[153]. 
213 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3. 
214 The domestic Canadian provisions were ss19 and 53(1) of the Immigration Act 1985. 
Mr Suresh has not been convicted of a serious crime and that limb of Art 33(2) is not 
relevant. 
215 He argued breach of Art 7 of the Charter (right to life, liberty and security), Art 12 
(prohibition against cruel and unusual treatment) and Canada’s international jus cogens 
obligations. 




“terrorism” and “danger to the security of Canada”, neither of which was 
defined in the legislation, were unconstitutionally vague.216  
 
Mr Suresh’s activities in Canada were non-violent:217 fund-raising and 
“support activities” of the Tamil cause.218 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that a narrow meaning of the word “danger”, which might 
have been the intended meaning in the Refugees Convention at the time it 
came into force in 1951, could not be adopted after 9/11:219  
 
Whatever the historic validity of insisting on direct proof of 
specific danger to the deporting country, as matters have evolved, 
we believe courts may now conclude that the support of terrorism 
abroad raises a possibility of adverse repercussions on Canada’s 
security. 
 
The Court emphasised first, the existence of terrorist transport and 
financial networks spanning the globe that may be used by terrorists. 
Secondly, terrorist acts and their consequences are global. Terrorists may 
target a place far from Canada “but the violent acts that support it may be 
close at hand”. Thirdly, the state is justified to take action that is 
preventive or precautionary, and consider “possible future risks”. Fourthly, 
Canada can further its national security through international cooperation 
in the area of anti-terrorism220 and its security may be dependent on that of 
another state.221  
                                                 
216 There was an additional, also unsuccessful, argument that the legislation infringed his 
right to freedom of speech and association, ss 2(a) and (d), of the Charter, rights triggered 
by the right of self-determination of Sri Lanka’s Tamils. 
217 Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 3. [16]; 16-17. 
218 Ibid., [100]; 56-57. 
219 Suresh 2002 SCC 1 (CanLII), [86]-[87]; [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 49-50. 
220 Ibid., [88]; 50-51. 
221 Ibid., [90], 51. 
 
 




Rehman v Home Secretary222 concerned a Pakistani national whom the 
UK government wanted to deport as “conducive to the public good”,223 
namely, in the interests of national security because of his alleged 
association with Islamic terrorist groups in the Indian subcontinent.  
 
The Home Secretary alleged that with his activities Mr Rehman directly 
supported a terrorist organization: first, Mr Rehman was recruiting British 
Muslims for military training and fundraising for a terrorist group and 
secondly, he was a “personal contact” of the world wide leader of two 
related terrorist groups.224  
 
Similarly to the case of Suresh, the executive government did not expect 
Mr Rehman and his “followers” to engage in any violence in the UK, but 
to continue to support and further the cause of terrorism outside of the UK.  
 
The executive’s deportation decision was overturned by the Special 
Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). The Court of Appeal 
concluded that SIAC’s view of what constituted “national security” was 
too narrow. 
 
Whatever may have been the position in the past, increasingly the 
security of one country is dependent upon the security of other 
countries. That is why this country has entered into numerous 
alliances. […] The establishment of NATO is but a reflection of 
this reality. An attack on an ally can undermine the security of this 
country.225 
 
                                                 
222 Home Secretary v. Rehman [2001] UKHL 47. 
223 Section 3(5)(b) of the Immigration Act 1971. 
224 Home Secreary v Rehman [2000] EWCA Civ 168, [20]. 
225 Ibid., [34]. 




The Court went further than the submission of the Attorney-General226 
that in “alleged terrorist cases, a person may be said to be a danger to the 
United Kingdom's national security if he or she engages in, promotes or 
encourages violent activity which has, or is likely to have, adverse 
repercussions on the security of the United Kingdom, its system of 
government or its people.”227 The Court said that the repercussions could 
be direct or indirect and “likely” was too high a threshold and “it is 
sufficient if the adverse repercussions are of a kind which create a risk of 
adverse repercussions.”228 
 
But for all the talk about global cooperation and “adverse repercussions” 
states can do little by way of prevention outside of traditional criminal 
law. Where a person commits an offence (eg plots to commit a terrorist 
act) they can be punished. When prevention is applied to people who 
cannot be convicted of any offence, quite often it may be because the 
extent of the global threat is more imaginary than real. In Australia only 
two people, neither of whom is suspected of committing a crime in 
Australia, have been subjected to a control order.229 If Canada or the UK 
seriously wanted to fight terrorism they could have sought to prosecute Mr 
Suresh or Mr Rehman in Canada or the UK respectively. 
 
The Canadian and UK cases concerned people – allegedly dangerous 
terrorist – whom the government wanted to deport.230 This system has 
                                                 
226 Appearing as friend of the court. 
227 Home Secreary v Rehman[2000] EWCA Civ 168, [38].  
228 Ibid., [39].  
229 Apart from Thomas, the other person until late December 2008 was David Hicks. 
Jabbour v Hicks [2008] FMCA 178. David Hicks is no longer subject to a control order. 
See M. Knox, “Hicks Free, Now Keen to Clear His Name”, The Age, 22 December 2008. 
Last accessed on 26 December 2008 at http://www.theage.com.au/national/hicks-free-
now-keen-to-clear-his-name-20081221-7319.html 
BBC News, “Control order for detainee Hicks”, 21 December 2006. Last accessed on 1 
May 2008 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7155138.stm. 
230 Except for one person who was prevented from going to Iraq. 
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been termed a “three walled prison“ because removing or deporting the 
allegedly terrorists may allow them to start operating from elsewhere 
without interference.231 The UK government itself referred to this 
phenomenon as “exporting risk”.232 
 
It is the fear of the unknown and potentially catastrophic future – 
something might happen unless action is taken – which leads to the 
making of control orders or an attempt to deport a person.  
 
On the one hand, the threat of terrorism is vague and unknowable. Radical 
uncertainty requires radical precaution. Courts in construing the meaning 
of words – eg “terrorism”, “danger”, “national security” – err on the side 
of caution and use a broad interpretation to ensure that the legislation 
covers a wide field and is as effective as possible (eg organisations that 
have existed for a long time and had nothing to do with 9/11 were 
proscribed after September 2001).233  
 
On the other hand, Ulrich Beck did not place terrorism on his list of 
manufactured risks until after 9/11. As Ileana Porras argues, “terrorism”, 
which since 9/11 it is often used synonymously with Al-Qaida and Osama 
bin Laden, has become:234 
                                                 
231 J. Ip, “Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects”, (2007) 16 
Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 773, 832.  
Ironically, in Charkaoui the executive argued as an alternative ground to danger that the 
Federal Court should confirm the certificate on the basis that he may leave Canada and 
therefore not appear at proceedings or for removal and therefore must be detained. The 
risk of non-appearance at proceeding or for removal is an alternative ground for the 
confirmation of the order, s83(3). Re Charkaoui 2003 FC 882 (CanLII), [53]; [2004] 1 
F.C.R. 528, 549-50. 
232 UK House of Commons Standing Committee E col 271, 25 Ocotober 2005, T. 
McNulty as cited in C. Walker, “The Treatment of Foreign Terror Suspects”, (2007) 
Modern Law Review 427. 
233 Eg the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka. 
234 I.M. Porras, “On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw”, (1994) Utah 
Law Review 119, 120. 




[T]he repository of everything that cannot be allowed to fit inside 
the self image of democracy; […] it has become the “other” that 
threatens, that desires the annihilation of the democratic “self” and 
against which democracies therefore strenuously defend 
themselves. 
 
Mr Charkaoui’s interest in karate provided both a sufficient “connection” 
to Al-Qaida – which gives the ultimate justification for any kind of anti-
terrorism measures. In Thomas, six out of the seven justices refer to 9/11, 
Al Qaida or Osama bin Laden as the embodiment of “the mischief to 
which the legislation is directed”,235 while simultaneously it was said that 
the people who may want to commit acts of terrorism, are elusive and hard 
to identify.236 
 
Events or facts may have been of no interest to authorities some years ago 
– an interest in martial arts (Mr Charkaoui), training in a camp in 
Afghanistan in the 1990s or meeting Osama bin Laden briefly on three 
occasions (Mr Thomas). But post 9/11 these facts are re-interpreted – by 




In a 2007 article Greg Mythen asks whether ‘new terrorism’ is “perceived 
as a significant threat, or a politically mediated red herring.”237 Although 
we only considered a handful of cases, the answer seems to be that judges 
perceive terrorism as a very significant threat.  
                                                 
235 Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194; [2007] HCA 33, per Gummow and Crennan 
JJ 223; [87]. 
236 See eg Thomas v Mowbray hearing of 6 December, Callinan J. Thomas v Mowbray 
[2006] HCATrans 661 (6 December 2006). Last accessed on 17 June 2008 at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/other/HCATrans/2006/661.html.  
237 G. Mythen, “Reappraising the Risk Society Thesis: Telescopic Sight or Myopic 
Vision?”, (2007) 55(3) Current Sociology 793-813, 805. 
 
 
54                                     CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES         [VOL. 05 NO. 01 
 
 
The limited evidence we examined suggests that courts have become 
caught up in the fear of terrorism which has “become part and parcel of 
the modern condition, the perception of society being at risk is pervasive 
and self-conditioning.”238 
 
Precautionary logic is ubiquitous in the decisions. The judiciary does not 
appear to be a reluctant actor in the executive’s game of “decisionism”. 
Overall, it is not a watchdog acting against executive attempts to 
overreach. In the majority of the cases the judiciary adopts the 
precautionary “better safe than sorry” approach.  
 
In the decisions there are many references to the need to safeguard 
individual human rights but national security usually prevails. Once the 
executive has built the edifice called national security legislation, the 
courts, in the decisions considered in this thesis (except for one), may get 
the executive to repaint it – they may tinker with procedural safeguards or 
the details of a control order – but the building stays in place.  
 
The global terrorist threat serves as a justification for upholding the 
validity of legislation with domestic remedies. The completely illogical 
outcome is that often states seek to expel or move the ‘danger’. The 
ticking bomb is not neutralised, it is moved elsewhere.  
 
None of the legislation considered in this thesis involved proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. Where the legislation does not provide for a precise 
burden of proof several courts emphasise the need to use a burden of proof 
lower than balance of probabilities. For most judges action is required 
because a catastrophic terrorist act may happen.  
 
Government are moving from unknown unknowns – not knowing who or 
what to protect itself from – to what it believes to be known unknowns – 
anyone who has any connection with terrorism, no matter how 
insignificant, becomes a known. The most minor biographical detail, the 
most casual acquaintance acquire sinister overtones. But why he is a 
                                                 
238 G. Mythen and S. Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security”, (2008) 
39(2-3) Security Dialogue 221, 233. 




danger or what he might do in the future remains unknown. Therein lies a 
paradox: when trivial facts are construed as revealing a threat the stakes 
are raised even higher to take precautionary measures.  
 
The way the legislation operates is part of what has been called “targeted 
governance” which operates on the basis of a set of measurable risk 
factors such as Muslim religion, travel to certain countries at a certain time 
(Afghanistan in the late 1990s) and so on. It is part of a “dream” of a 
“‘smart,’ specific, side-effects-free, information-driven utopia of 
governance.”239 
 
While the discourse of precaution affects most of the decisions reviewed 
in this thesis, more research is needed to confirm the presence of the logic 
of precaution in judicial decision making. A larger sample of lower level 
court decisions should reveal whether or not these are genuine trends.  
 
Some words of cautious optimism. David Cole claims that if one considers 
court decision over a longer period of time “judicial review of emergency 
and national security measures can and has established important 
constraints on the exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the 
scope of what is acceptable in future emergencies.”240 However, if the 
current war on terror is not an emergency but “the new normalcy”241 then 
we should expect to see the judiciary continue to exhibit a disturbing 
combination of deference to the executive together with a move away 
from personal criminal responsibility for past acts to precautionary 
measures against whole classes of people for potential future acts. 
                                                 
239 M. Valverde and M. Mopas, “Insecurity and the Dream of Targeted Governance,” in 
W. Larner and W. Walters (eds.), Global Governmentality: Governing International 
Spaces, London: Routledge, 2004, 239 as cited in L. Amoore and M. de Goede, 
“Governance, Risk and Dataveillance in the War on Terror”, (2005) 43 Crime, Law & 
Social Change 149, 150. 
240 D. Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in 
Times of Crisis”, (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 2565-2595, 2566. 
241 Vice-President Dick Cheney in Lynn Ludlow, “Paper Tigers”, SF Chronicle, 4 
November 2001 as cited in David Cole, “Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review 
and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis”, (2003) 101 Michigan Law Review 2565-2595, 
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